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A B S T R A C T
Motivated by the recent discovery of a significant increase in corporate debt in developed countries, we use a
large sample of 775 listed companies to examine the dynamics and determinants of South African corporate
debt. We find an 89% increase in the leverage of the average firm, from 11% in 1990 to 21% in 2015. Long-term
and short-term debt increased by 103% and 67%, respectively. We find that this increase is pervasive, and
cannot be explained entirely by either firm attributes or macroeconomic factors, despite the importance of the
latter. Instead, we find supply-side factors to be the main determinants of the upward trend in corporate debt,
highlighting their importance to corporate debt policies in emerging economies.
1. Introduction
Corporate financing decisions are essential components of a corpo-
rate strategy and can determine the success or failure of a firm, espe-
cially during periods of significant contractions in credit supply. Using
more debt can maximise a firm’s value, but can also inadvertently lead
to bankruptcy in an economic downturn. Recent research on developed
economies documents a marked increase in corporate debt (ratio of
total debt to total assets). For example, Graham et al. (2015) attribute
the fourfold increase in US corporate debt, from 11% in 1945 to 47% in
the 1990s, to the rise in macroeconomic uncertainty, public debt, and
financial development. Campello et al. (2010), Campello and Giambona
(2013), and Kahle and Stulz (2013) report a marked surge in corporate
debt before the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007/2008.
In addition, Custódio et al. (2013) document significant changes in debt
composition as debt maturity continues to decrease in the United States.
They attribute this to an influx of young firms with high information
asymmetry and limited access to long-term financing. Other than these
significant findings related to the United States, little is known about
the dynamics of corporate debt in emerging markets, which are be-
leaguered by inadequate institutional frameworks.
Emerging markets provide interesting research settings because
their weak institutional structures and the low levels of capital market
development create greater challenges in accessing external sources of
financing. Firms in developed countries find it easier to raise external
finance, owing to institutional openness and higher levels and quality of
information disclosure. However, firms in emerging markets find it
more difficult because of high levels of information asymmetry and
weak regulatory frameworks, which inadequately discourage or restrict
adverse practices, such as corruption (Areneke and Kimani, 2019).
Accordingly, the trends and determinants of corporate debt in emerging
economies may be dissimilar to those identified for more developed
capital markets (Custódio et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2015). We con-
jecture that the determinants of the rising corporate debt levels in de-
veloped economies may not be generalizable to emerging economies,
which have markedly different financial infrastructures, degrees of in-
stitutional openness, and levels of capital market development.
We test this conjecture and fill the associated research gap by in-
vestigating the evolution and determinants of corporate debt in South
Africa for the period 1990–2015. The choice of South Africa (SA) is
motivated by two main factors that make the situation representative of
an emerging economy. First, SA has the largest, most developed, and
best-regulated stock market in Africa (You et al., 2019). This makes it
the continent’s financial hub south of the Sahara, and the destination of
choice for foreign and regional banks, which are the main suppliers of
firm credit. Furthermore, unlike other African countries, SA has a high
level of institutional shareholding and well-diversified ownership and
financing sources, of which debt is the most prominent (Hearn et al.,
2010).
Second, relative to other emerging economies, SA’s economic and
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political history has interesting similarities and differences that make it
an ideal case for examining whether macroeconomic and supply-side
factors influence corporate financing decisions. Specifically, SA ex-
perienced two distinct political and economic phases. The first phase
lasted until 1995, before which the country was isolated owing to re-
strictions imposed by international organizations for the practice of
apartheid (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Throughout this period, the
government regulated financial transactions in assets by requiring that
most payments be made using domestic equity investments, rather than
using money-market or bond-market instruments (Kapingura and
Makhetha-Kosi, 2014). The second phase followed the abolition of
apartheid in 1995. This phase led to financial liberalization, which
included the acceptance of foreign investment and the subsequent
growth of the bond market. As a result, SA has risen as an ‘emerging
economy’, boasting one of the most developed bond markets on the
continent. In 2012, SA had the highest level of corporate and sovereign
debt amongst African countries (Mecagni et al., 2014). It also currently
boasts of having one of the most sophisticated and robust corporate
governance systems among emerging economies, comparable with
those in the United Kingdom and the United States. According to Ntim
et al. (2012), SA’s practice is an exemplification of how corporate
governance practices can be customized to meet institutional realities in
emerging markets. Furthermore, the SA government has implemented a
corporate governance code (The King Report), which it has revised
several times in order to boost investor confidence in the local equity
and bond markets. These factors make SA a particularly interesting case
study.
We report comparative statistics to further strengthen both the ap-
propriateness and characteristics of the SA context. Fig. 1 plots average
stock market capitalization (Graph 1a) and private credit (Graph 1b) as
ratios to GDP for SA, the United States, the United Kingdom, Sub-Sa-
haran Africa (SSA), and the ‘World’.1 The figure shows that the capi-
talization ratio is rising faster than it is in other countries. In addition,
private credit is tracking that of the United States, is often higher than
that of the United Kingdom, and is substantially higher than that of SSA
countries. Furthermore, with the highest global investment flow, SA is
comparable with the other BRICS countries (Mensi et al., 2014; You
et al., 2019). This combination makes the country a channel through
which global economic shocks, such as the recent credit supply shock,
can be transmitted to other emerging economies, in general, and to
African economies in particular.
Although these characteristics of SA have several important
implications related to corporate financing decisions, to our knowledge,
these implications have not yet been investigated. Against this back-
ground, we formulate and test three hypotheses, linked to the following
questions. How is corporate debt finance evolving? Do traditional de-
mand-side determinants of corporate debt explain this evolution? If not,
what other factors could do so? These questions have not been ad-
dressed sufficiently in the context of emerging markets.
By way of motivation for this study, we present several observa-
tions. Graph 1a of Fig. 2 shows that average total debt in SA increased
by 89% over the entire sample period. Interestingly, this coincides with
a marked decrease in collateral (tangible assets, represented by prop-
erty, plant, and equipment, or PPE) and a significant rise in intangible
assets and investment.2 This suggests that a high proportion of in-
tangible assets (the difference between non-current assets and PPE) is
being financed by debt, which further increases corporate risk. This is
contrary to the theory of Krainer (2014), which posits that firms use
their capital structure to manage or counteract risk in investment
portfolios. We analyse this further, and find that changes in firm
characteristics over the sample period do not explain the increase in
corporate debt, because these characteristics have changed in a way
that does not predict the use of leverage. For example, the downward
trend of asset tangibility suggests that corporate debt capacity should
be decreasing. Over the entire sample period, and without control
variables, the average basic statistics on overall trends in firm size and
profitability are not significantly different from zero. According to
theory, this predicts neither leveraging nor deleveraging; nevertheless,
we observe significant overall average leveraging. Simultaneously,
other factors, such as Tobin’s q and non-debt tax shield, which are
theoretically associated with low-debt financing, are increasing. These
trends are surprising, because they suggest that corporate debt should
be decreasing, instead of increasing. Thus, the increase in corporate
debt does not initially seem to be explained by changes in firm-specific
characteristics.
Accordingly, we examine whether changes in macroeconomic con-
ditions drive the dynamics in corporate debt (Custódio et al., 2013;
Oztekin, 2015; Graham et al., 2015). We focus on the following mac-
roeconomic factors: foreign direct investment, total value of stocks
traded, GDP growth, interest rate spread, real interest rate, inflation,
and domestic credit. We find that macroeconomic factors are important
Fig. 1. Institutional context.
1 All amounts are denominated in USD.
2 In untabulated results, we find that intangible assets increased by 201%,
from a low of 7.2% in 1991 to a peak of 21.6% in 2015). Several other studies
on developed economies report similar marked increases in intangible invest-
ments, or R&D, which should, theoretically, lead to a decrease in the use of debt
financing (Brown et al., 2012; Borisova and Brown, 2013; Manikas et al., 2019).
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determinants of corporate debt, but only partially explain the increase
in debt financing in SA, because the trend remains significant even after
accounting for these factors. Consequently, we examine whether
supply-side factors, which are largely overlooked in the literature, ac-
count for the residual increase in corporate debt. We find that changes
in the capital markets explain this residual trend in corporate debt. This
suggests that the trend is significantly higher in the pre-crisis periods
and post-liberalization of the capital markets than that in the post-crisis
and pre-liberalization periods, respectively. This evidence highlights
the emerging and significant role of supply-side factors as determinants
of corporate debt.
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, in ex-
plaining the rise in corporate debt levels in emerging markets, we de-
viate from previous studies to show the importance of unstudied
supply-side factors. Most prior studies focus on developed economies
and limit the scope of the determinants of corporate debt to demand-
side and macroeconomic factors (e.g. Dang, 2011; Custódio et al., 2013;
Graham et al., 2015). In doing so, they overlook supply-side factors and
the uniqueness of emerging economies in terms of economic growth,
financial and institutional structures, and institutional challenges to
corporate practices. We advance the literature by showing that supply-
side factors are major determinants of the rising levels of corporate debt
faced by firms in emerging economies (as exemplified by SA), where
access to external capital is limited. Second, contrary to theory and the
results reported on for developed economies (see Dang, 2011; Leary and
Roberts, 2010; Oztekin, 2015), we find that demand-side factors (size,
tangibility, and profitability) are unable to explain the evolution of
corporate debt in SA. The actual changes in these factors lead to a
theoretical prediction of deleveraging, because firms’ debt capacity is
shrinking over time. Instead, we observe a strong increasing trend in
leverage. Finally, we provide further evidence on the effects of mac-
roeconomic conditions on corporate debt in emerging economies. Here,
we find that macroeconomic factors are important, but that they only
partially explain the rising levels of corporate debt in SA. This is not
entirely consistent with the model of Chen (2010), which highlights
macroeconomic conditions as the most important determinants of cor-
porate dynamics in developed economies. The most likely reason for
this discrepancy is the limited financing choices available to firms that
operate in emerging economies. Thus, supply-side factors appear to be
better determinants of the rising levels of corporate debt in these
countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the
theory and hypotheses, Section 3 discusses the methodology, Section 4
presents the data used in the analyses, Section 5 discusses the empirical
results, Section 6 presents robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Theory and hypotheses
Several studies based on the United States report marked changes in
the composition of firms as economies shift from a manufacturing to a
technology and service orientation. For example, Fama and French
(2001, 2004) attribute the increase in new equity issues and the de-
crease in dividends to an influx of young and less profitable firms. Lee
et al. (2000) find that corporate debt dynamics in South Korea are
explained by firm-specific factors, such as size, growth rate, and tan-
gible assets. Céspedes et al. (2010) document that, despite the less
developed nature of the countries’ capital markets, firms in Latin
America exhibit similar levels of corporate debt to those of firms in the
United States. They attribute this puzzling observation to ownership
concentration, where firms resort to debt to avoid ceding control or
dilution. Given such evidence, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). An increase in corporate debt is attributable to
changes in firm-specific (demand-side) factors.
Furthermore, the extant literature reports that macroeconomic
factors have significant effects on capital structure. For example, the
model of Korajczyk and Levy (2003) predicts that leverage is pro-cy-
clical and counter-cyclical. Cook and Tang (2010) find that firms adjust
their capital structure towards a target more quickly in good macro-
economic environments. In addition, Chen (2010) reports that the
economic growth rate, economic uncertainty, and business-cycle var-
iations have a significant influence on corporate debt. Accordingly, our
second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Changes in macroeconomic factors explain the
dynamics in corporate debt.
Finally, compared with the effects of demand-side factors, the ef-
fects of supply-side factors have not been examined sufficiently in the
literature. Prior studies show that historical, institutional, and legal
factors that affect the credit supply have a significant influence on
firms’ financing policies. For example, Chen (2004) reports that im-
mature and incomplete legal and institutional frameworks in China
(i.e., firm-specific factors) appear to be important determinants of
firms’ capital structures. Similarly, Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2014) finds
that factors such as legal tradition, creditor rights, and the stage of fi-
nancial sector development significantly affect the capital structure of
microfinance institutions. Furthermore, the GFC has brought to the fore
the importance of supply-side factors in terms of the credit supply and
corporate financing decisions, which are pertinent conditions in emer-
ging economies. However, examining supply-side factors in such
economies is limited by data availability on variables such as credit,
Fig. 2. The evolution of leverage.
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credit lines, and bond ratings. One way to deal with this challenge is to
conduct event studies around credit supply shock events as quasi-ex-
periments. Several such studies report significant effects of supply-side
factors on corporate financing decisions in the United States. For ex-
ample, Campello et al. (2011) find that firms with credit lines fared
better during the GFC than those without credit lines did. Similarly,
Leary (2009) reports a significant decrease in the supply of bank loans
in the aftermath of the 1966 credit crunch. Using a similar approach,
Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that the collapse of Drexel Burnham
Lambert Inc. and the subsequent regulatory changes in 1989 had sig-
nificant adverse effects on the high-yield (junk) bond market. Moti-
vated by evidence from this literature on the possible relevance of
supply-side factors, we examine the changes in corporate debt in SA
around the GFC, the Tech Bubble, and financial liberalization period.
We thus formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Changes in supply-side factors explain the
evolution of corporate debt.
3. Methodology
To investigate factors affecting the evolution of corporate debt, we
estimate several versions of the following general model:= + + + +D Trend X Z ,it it it it1 1 (1)
where Dit denotes the corporate debt (ratio of total debt to total assets)
of firm i at time t; Trend is a time trend; X it 1 is a vector of lagged firm-
specific variables; Zit 1 is a vector of lagged macroeconomic variables;
, , and are parameter coefficients to be estimated; and it is an
error term. The lagged firm-specific variables in X it 1 are as follows:
Tobin’s q, research and development (R&D), size (Size), return on assets
(ROA), property, plant, and equipment (PPE), and non-debt tax shield
(NDTS).3 The lagged macroeconomic variables in Zit 1 are as follows:
foreign direct investment (FDI), gross domestic product growth (GDP
Growth), interest spread (IR Spread), real interest rate (RealIR), infla-
tion (Inflation), and the value of domestic bank credit to the private
sector (Domestic Credit). All variables used are defined in Table 1.
4. Data
Our data consist of annual accounting and macroeconomic variables
and economic event dates. The accounting data were obtained from
annual reports of publicly listed firms in SA, drawn from Thomson
Reuters Datastream, for the period 1990 to 2015. The macroeconomic
variables used are taken from The World-bank Database (WDI). As is
standard in the literature, we exclude firms in regulated sectors (fi-
nancial firms and utilities) and firms with missing data on key variables
(total assets and sales).4 We set missing R&D observations to zero, and
winsorize all firm-level variables used at the upper and bottom 1% in
order to reduce the effects of spurious outliers. The final sample consists
of 8,632 firm-year observations on 775 firms, and is unbalanced as a
result of different entry and exit points of firms over the sample period.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used. The
means (medians) of total debt (TDA), long-term debt (LTDA), and short-
term debt (STDA) are 15.2% (13.1%), 9.1% (5.9%), and 6.1% (4.3%),
respectively. The high proportion of short-term debt (40%) is in line
with the findings of Sorge et al. (2017), reflecting the high exposure of
South African firms (and, by inference, firms in developing economies)
to refinancing risk, because most of the short-term debt is in the form of
bank loans. Of particular interest are the significant and positive trends
in TDA, LTDA, and STDA, which indicate a statistically significant
increase during the sample period in the use of debt financing by SA
firms.5 These trends are consistent with the plots in Fig. 2. The basic
statistics for the determinants of leverage (Tobin’s q, R&D, Size, ROA,
PPE, and NDTS) in Panel A are comparable with those in the literature.
However, the trends of all variables that should be positively associated
with debt financing (i.e., Size, ROA, and PPE) are negative, whereas
those of the variables that should be negatively associated with debt
(i.e., Tobin’s q and NDTS) are positive. These trends predict that debt
should be decreasing, which suggests a priori that demand-side factors
(i.e., Tobin’s q, R&D, Size, ROA, PPE, and NDTS) are less likely to ex-
plain the upward trend in leverage shown in Fig. 2.
Table 3 presents the corporate debt statistics for the sample firms,
grouped by high or low levels of financial constraints. We use four
proxies of financial constraints commonly used in the literature: age,
size, tangibility, and the WW Index of Whited (2006). In each year, we
partition firms into high and low groups, based on whether they are
above or below the average of each of the four proxies of financial
constraints. This partitioning enables us to test whether binding fi-
nancial constraints can explain the changes in leverage. The results,
presented in Table 3, show that mature, large, high-tangibility, and low-
WW-Index firms have higher average levels of leverage than young,
small, low-tangibility, and high-WW-Index firms. These results are
consistent with the literature on the effects of financial constraints on
financial decisions, and show that unconstrained firms have greater
access to debt financing, relative to constrained firms (see Brown et al.,
2009, 2012; Brown and Petersen, 2015). Comparisons of the differences
in the trends show positive values, implying stronger trends for highly
constrained firms. The statistical significance of this difference is mixed,
but is clearer for long-term debt.
Table 4 presents the Spearman (above diagonal) and Pearson (below
diagonal) pairwise correlations between all variables used. Total debt is
positively correlated with size, NDTS, and PPE, and negatively corre-
lated with Tobin’s q, R&D, and profitability. The correlations are in line
with theory, except for that of NDTS, which, apart from its correlation
with size and PPE, appears to contradict the negative results reported
for firms in the United States (see Dang et al., 2014; Oztekin, 2015).
This appears to suggest that NDTS has a positive effect on corporate
debt in SA.
5. Empirical results
In the next three subsections, we examine the explanatory power of
traditional demand-side determinants, macroeconomic factors, and
supply-side factors.
5.1. What are the effects of firm-specific factors on corporate debt?
We estimate several variants of our baseline model shown in Eq. (1).
The results are summarized in Table 5. Column (1) presents the esti-
mation results using the main traditional firm-specific determinants of
corporate debt. Columns (2)–(6) present the estimation results when
including the time trend and dummy variables for period and year-of-
listing.
In general, the results in Table 5 show that R&D, Size, PPE, and
NDTS have a positive and significant (except R&D) effect on corporate
debt, whereas Tobin’s q and profitability (ROA) have a negative effect.
In general, these results are consistent with theory, except for NDTS,
which turns out to be positive. In contrast, theory predicts a negative
effect on corporate debt, because NDTS is a substitute for interest-tax
shield. Most of the coefficients of the determinants of corporate debt
have the expected sign. thus, for brevity, we do not discuss these
3 Our choices of firm-level determinants of corporate debt are informed by the
existing literature (Dang et al., 2012; Dang et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2015).
4 The increase in corporate debt is pervasive and significant across industries.
5 The ‘Trend’ in Table 2 is the estimated slope of a regression of leverage
(ratio to total assets of total debt (TDA), long-term debt (LTDA), or short-term
debt (STDA)) on a time trend.
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coefficients further; instead, we shift our focus to the important trend
variables.
Column (2) presents the estimation results for the model when the
two dummy variables, Period2000 09 and Period2010 15, are included. This
allows us to test whether firm-specific characteristics explain the in-
crease in corporate debt over time. The coefficient estimates on these
dummies are positive and significant, indicating that demand-side
factors, represented by the variables included in model (1), do not fully
Table 1
Variable definitions.
Variable Definition
TDA Total debt to total assets (Corporate debt)
LTDA Long-term debt to total assets
STDA Short-term debt to total assets
Trend Slope of regressing TDA, LTDA, or STDA on a time trend
Listing1990 99 Dummy = 1 for firms first listed between 1990 and 1999, and zero otherwise
Listing2000 09 Dummy = 1 for firms first listed between 2000 and 2009, and zero otherwise
Listing2010 15 Dummy = 1 for firms first listed between 2010 and 2015, and zero otherwise
Period1990 99 Dummy = 1 for the period from 1990 to 1999, and zero otherwise
Period2000 09 Dummy = 1 for the period from 2000 to 2000, and zero otherwise
Period2010 15 Dummy = 1 for the period from 2011 to 2015, and zero otherwise
Tobin’s q Market-to-book ratio
R&D Research and development to total assets
Size Logarithm of total assets
ROA Earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation to total assets
PPE Property, plant, and equipment to total assets
NDTS Depreciation to total assets
Age The difference between the year when a firm first appears in the database and
the current year
WW Index × × + ×DivDummy0.091 0.062 0.021CashFlowAssets TotaldebtAssets× + × ×Size IndustrySalesGrowth SalesGrowth0.044 0.102 0.035
The WW Index is based on the work of Whited (2006)
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
Stock Traded Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP)
GDP Growth GDP growth (annual %)
IR Spread Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate %)
RealIR Real interest rate (%)
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Domestic Credit Domestic credit to the private sector by banks (% of GDP)
Stock Market Cap Stock market capitalization to GDP (% of GDP)
Firm-level and macroeconomic variables are taken from Datastream and The World Bank, and are winsorized at the
lower and upper one percentiles. The sample covers the period 1990 to 2015 for nonfinancial and nonutility firms in
South Africa.
Table 2
Basic statistics.
Panel A: All firms
Trend
Description N Firms Mean Stdev Min p25 p50 p75 Max Mean Median
TDA 8632 775 0.152 0.133 0.000 0.041 0.131 0.227 0.773 0.336∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
LTDA 775 775 0.091 0.107 0.000 0.009 0.059 0.132 0.771 0.204∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
STDA 8632 775 0.061 0.065 0.000 0.007 0.043 0.093 0.531 0.132∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
Tobin’s q 8632 775 1.635 0.896 0.246 1.033 1.371 2.001 9.951 1.020∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
R&D 8632 775 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 −0.001 0.000
Size 8043 775 15.357 1.678 9.852 14.220 15.531 16.512 19.221 −0.800 −0.639
ROA 8043 775 0.199 0.107 0.004 0.133 0.182 0.243 0.982 −0.024 −0.041
PPE 8043 775 0.376 0.238 0.008 0.175 0.334 0.571 0.978 −0.680∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗
NDTS 8043 775 0.039 0.024 0.000 0.024 0.036 0.051 0.279 0.070∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables
Variable N Mean Stdev Min p25 p50 p75 Max Trend
FDI 8632 0.014 0.013 −0.001 0.004 0.010 0.022 0.060 0.058∗∗
Stock Traded 8632 0.465 0.237 0.054 0.280 0.517 0.700 0.861 2.970∗∗∗
GDP Growth 8632 0.027 0.020 −0.021 0.022 0.030 0.042 0.056 0.077
IR Spread 8632 0.042 0.009 0.021 0.033 0.044 0.047 0.058 −0.041
RealIR 8632 0.054 0.028 0.022 0.033 0.045 0.058 0.130 −0.149∗∗
Inflation 8632 0.069 0.031 0.014 0.050 0.059 0.086 0.153 −0.286∗∗∗
Domestic Credit 8425 1.323 0.185 0.785 1.159 1.382 1.477 1.601 2.383∗∗∗
Variables defined in Table 1. Significance: ∗ < .10, ∗∗<.05, ∗∗∗<.01.
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Table 3
Difference between firms.
Financial Constraint Low High Diff (High - Low) Trend
Variables N Mean p50 Stdev Trend N Mean p50 Stdev Trend Mean p50 Stdev Wald test
Age TDA 4731 0.143 0.119 0.131 0.326∗∗∗ 3,901 0.163 0.143 0.134 0.352∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.003 0.18
LTDA 4731 0.082 0.049 0.100 0.170∗∗∗ 3,901 0.101 0.072 0.113 0.251∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 2.33
STDA 4731 0.060 0.038 0.071 0.155∗∗∗ 3,901 0.062 0.049 0.058 0.101∗∗∗ 0.002 0.011∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ 3.50∗
Size TDA 4358 0.131 0.103 0.125 0.181∗∗∗ 4,274 0.174 0.152 0.138 0.352∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.18
LTDA 4358 0.072 0.037 0.098 0.039 4,274 0.110 0.082 0.112 0.374∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 40.50∗∗∗
STDA 4358 0.059 0.035 0.068 0.145∗∗∗ 4,274 0.063 0.050 0.063 0.117∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 1.06
Tangibility TDA 4373 0.131 0.113 0.112 0.160∗∗∗ 4,259 0.174 0.152 0.149 0.519∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 39.52∗∗∗
LTDA 4373 0.065 0.042 0.077 0.042 4,259 0.117 0.089 0.125 0.374∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 48.51∗∗∗
STDA 4373 0.065 0.044 0.071 0.115∗∗∗ 4,259 0.057 0.042 0.059 0.147∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.012∗∗∗ 0.98
WW Index TDA 4365 0.166 0.147 0.134 0.470∗∗∗ 4,267 0.138 0.109 0.130 0.200∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ 18.93∗∗∗
LTDA 4365 0.103 0.076 0.108 0.344∗∗∗ 4,267 0.078 0.040 0.103 0.062∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 26.39∗∗∗
STDA 4365 0.063 0.048 0.064 0.122∗∗∗ 4,267 0.059 0.038 0.067 0.141∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.47
Diff = difference. Significance: ∗ < .10, ∗∗<.05, ∗∗∗<.01.
Table 4
Correlations.
Variables TDA LTDA STDA Tobin’s q R&D Size ROA PPE NDTS
TDA 1 0.853∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
LTDA 0.865∗∗∗ 1 0.412∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.286∗∗∗
STDA 0.605∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 1 −0.177∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
Tobin’s q −0.134∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ 1 −0.069∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ 0.029
R&D −0.003 −0.042∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ 1 0.370∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.082∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
Size 0.137∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.085∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 1 −0.189∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
ROA −0.155∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.128∗∗∗ 1 −0.119∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
PPE 0.003 0.135∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ 1 −0.102∗∗∗
NDTS 0.204∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ −0.008 0.146∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ 1
Significance: ∗ < .10, ∗∗<.05, ∗∗∗<.01.
Table 5
Determinants of debt.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trend×100 0.321∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.054) (0.053)
Period2000 09 0.032∗∗∗
(0.006)
Period2010 15 0.044∗∗∗
(0.008)
Listing2000 09 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.017∗
(0.010) (0.009)
Listing2010 15 −0.017 −0.015
(0.016) (0.014)
Tobin’s q −0.009∗∗ −0.004 −0.007∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D 0.189 0.150 0.201 0.155
(0.668) (0.627) (0.643) (0.658)
Size 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA −0.115∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
PPE 0.110∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
NDTS 0.715∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152)
Constant −0.154∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.010) (0.041) (0.010) (0.042)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes No No No No No
N 8,043 8,043 8,632 8,043 8,632 8,043
R2 0.199 0.184 0.102 0.192 0.110 0.194
FE = fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ∗ < .10, ∗∗<.05, ∗∗∗<.01.
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explain the evolution of corporate debt. A comparison of the coefficient
on Period2000 09 with that on Period2010 15 shows that the latter is sig-
nificantly larger (the p-value of the Wald test is 0.019), which suggests
that the increase in corporate debt is relatively higher in the latter
period. Column (3) presents the estimation results of the model when
only the time trend of corporate debt is included, with a constant. The
coefficient estimate on this time trend is positive and significant, which
is consistent with the results shown in Table 2. The marginal effects of
the model in Column (3) suggest that the average firm increases its use
of corporate debt by 0.32% each year. Similarly, the coefficient of the
time trend in Column (4) shows that including the other determinants
does not reduce the magnitude and significance of this trend by much;
in tihs case, the average firm increases its debt financing by 0.30% each
year, using the marginal effects.
We next examine the effects of new listings. We create three dummy
variables, based on the particular decade in which a firm first appears
in the data set (Listing1990 99, Listing2000 09, and Listing2010 15). Column
(5) presents the estimation results when these listing dummies (less one,
Listing1980 89) are included, and the firm-specific variables are excluded.
The coefficient on the time trend remains positive and significant, and
only the coefficient on Listing2010 15 is significant. The estimation in
Column (6) includes the firm-specific variables as controls. The results
on the time trend, listing dummies, and control variables are similar to
those in Columns (4) and (5). This suggests that, apart from the slight
significance of the 2000–09 decade, the year in which a firm was listed
does not explain the upward trend in corporate debt. The coefficients
on the firm-specific variables remain largely unchanged from Column
(4). Therefore, these variables may be important determinants of cor-
porate debt, even though they do not fully explain the rising levels of
corporate debt in SA, because the coefficient on the time trend remains
consistently positive and significant across the various specifications.6
Overall, the results in Table 5 show that the increase in corporate
debt is persistent. Furthermore, firm-specific variables, though im-
portant (apart from R&D), do not fully explain this time trend.
5.2. Do financial constraints matter?
Having established that none of the main firm-specific variables
identified in the literature fully explain the time trend in corporate
debt, we examine the variation in corporate debt across constrained and
unconstrained firms. We classify a firm as highly (low) constrained if it
is above (below) the average age, size, tangibility, or WW Index.
Table 6 presents the estimation results for Eq. (1), with a time trend and
firm-specific factors for the sub-groups, based on the four measures of
financial constraints.
The results show that the coefficient on the time trend remains
consistently positive and significant across all sub-samples based on
age, size, tangibility, and the WW Index. Thus, all firms have rising debt
levels, regardless of their age, size, or financial constraints. However,
the magnitude of the coefficient estimate on the trend is smaller for
firms with high financial constraints (young, small, low tangibility, and
high WW Index) than it is for firms with low financial constraints. This
suggests a lower rate of increase for constrained firms, and is consistent
with the consensus in the literature that binding financial constraints
limit access to external financing (see Almeida et al., 2004; Brown et al.,
2012; Dang et al., 2014; Whited, 2006). However, comparisons of the
trends in corporate debt (tabulated in the columns titled ‘Diff’) show
results that are inconsistent with H1, because the difference in the trend
coefficients between constrained and unconstrained firms is not statis-
tically significant. This is in line with the results of the univariate
analysis in Table 3, suggesting that the increase in corporate debt is
pervasive, and is not explained by differences in financial constraints.
Therefore, we conclude that neither firm characteristics nor fi-
nancial constraints explain the increase in corporate debt documented
over the sample period. Hence, these findings do not support H1.
5.3. Do macroeconomic factors matter?
We extend the above analyses by examining the explanatory power
of FDI, Stock Traded, GDP Growth, IR Spread, RealIR, Inflation, and
Domestic Credit as possible determinants. Our choice of these variables
is motivated by Custódio et al. (2013) and Graham et al. (2015), among
others, who find them significant. Table 7 presents the estimation re-
sults.
These results show that FDI, Stock Traded, RealIR, and Inflation
have significant and positive effects on corporate debt when each is
examined separately with firm-specific factors included; however, GDP
Growth and IR Spread have a negative effect. Although all macro-
economic variables are significant, except for Domestic Credit and the
IR Spread, they only partially explain the increase in corporate debt
(H2), as shown by the consistently significant and positive coefficient
on the time trend (Trend×100) across the model specifications. This
remains true in the model shown in Column (8), which includes all
firm-specific and macroeconomic variables. Note that the magnitude of
the trend coefficient decreases when Stock Traded is included (Columns
(2) and (8)), indicating the partial explanatory power of the stock
markets. These results are consistent with (H2) and with those reported
in Table 5, although the time trend in corporate debt remains.
5.4. Do supply-side factors matter?
We now examine the effects of supply-side factors (H3) using exo-
genous economic events that affect credit market conditions. We in-
vestigate the changes in corporate debt before and after crises and fi-
nancial liberalization events. Here, we consider financial liberalization
in relation to the end of apartheid in SA, when the apartheid sanctions
imposed in 1961 were lifted in 1994, and the country was re-admitted
into the global market in 1995. During the period 1961–1994, the
United Nations excluded SA from partaking in international unions, and
economic and trade sanctions were imposed, effectively stifling eco-
nomic growth and development (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). We classify
the period before 1995 as the pre-liberalization period (Andreasson,
2011; Chipeta et al., 2012), and examine whether the liberalization
event explains the trend in corporate debt, relative to that of the pre-
liberalization period. For the analyses of crisis events, we initially re-
strict the sample periods to ±four years around the Tech Bubble of 2000
and the GFC of 2008.7 Table 8 presents the estimation results for Eq. (1)
for the sub-periods.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 present the results around the Tech
Bubble. The trend coefficient estimate change from a significant 1.159
before the bubble to a nonsignificant −0.015 after the bubble. The
switch in sign and the decrease in magnitude are clear evidence that the
Tech Bubble had a significant adverse effect on the time trend in debt
financing. This suggests that firms in SA tend to use more debt when
economic conditions are favourable. These findings are consistent with
those of Cook and Tang (2010), who find that firms in the United States
adjust their capital structure relatively quickly in good times, and with
6 Garay et al. (2019), for example, find significant country and industry ef-
fects that, if ignored, lead to the mispricing of corporate bonds (spreads) in
emerging markets. Our results show a consistent positive and significant trend
in all leverage ratios across industries. This is inconsistent with the findings of
Harris and Raviv (1991), because it shows that the leverage ratios of SA firms
vary significantly, both across and within industries and over time.
7We also check alternative event dates (±five years), because our aggregate
(annual) data mean that these cannot be determined precisely. Our results re-
main qualitatively unchanged, and are robust to moving the event dates one
year forwards or backwards (not reported, but all results are available upon
request).
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those of Dierker et al. (2013), who find that firms also do so to manage
risk. According to Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014), institutional problems,
such as high information asymmetry, weak creditor rights, and policy
uncertainty, tend to limit corporate financing choices. The increased
use of debt financing prior to the Tech Bubble in SA further confirms
the findings of Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014), and shows a high negative
impact of economic downturns on debt financing in developing mar-
kets.
Table 6
Financial constraints.
Age Size Tangibility WW Index
Young Mature Diff Small Large Diff Low High Diff Low High Diff
Variables (1) (2) p-value (3) (4) p-value (5) (6) p-value (7) (8) p-value
Trend×100 0.282∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.760 0.220∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.285 0.218∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.321 0.271∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.750
(0.060) (0.071) (0.061) (0.059) (0.047) (0.069) (0.049) (0.064)
Tobin’s q 0.002 −0.023∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004 −0.014∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.001 0.120 −0.010∗∗ −0.003 0.231
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
R&D −0.310 0.848 0.318 −0.995∗∗ 3.507∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.092 1.913 0.192 1.241 −1.045∗ 0.011
(0.702) (0.952) (0.466) (1.111) (0.616) (1.465) (0.877) (0.617)
Size 0.003 0.026∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.017∗∗∗ 0.038 0.010∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.044 0.018∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.044
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ROA −0.143∗∗∗ −0.023 0.035 −0.173∗∗∗ −0.050 0.005 −0.084∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ 0.162 −0.068∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ 0.045
(0.035) (0.045) (0.033) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.031) (0.037)
PPE 0.084∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.226 0.083∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.181 0.028 0.158∗∗∗ 0.019 0.127∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.231
(0.024) (0.050) (0.029) (0.032) (0.042) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028)
NDTS 0.607∗∗∗ 0.505∗ 0.754 0.104 1.637∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.158 1.130∗∗∗ 0.000 1.615∗∗∗ 0.160 0.000
(0.176) (0.278) (0.162) (0.260) (0.171) (0.215) (0.221) (0.157)
Constant −0.022 −0.387∗∗∗ 0.000 0.052 −0.296∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.011 −0.337∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.303∗∗∗ −0.036 0.002
(0.054) (0.069) (0.058) (0.100) (0.052) (0.068) (0.065) (0.061)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No No No No No No No
N 4,249 3,794 3,948 4,095 4,027 4,016 4,151 3,892
R2 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.30 0.12 0.26 0.30 0.11
Diff = difference. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ∗ < .10, ∗∗<.05, ∗∗∗<.01.
Table 7
Macroeconomic factors.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trend×100 0.289∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.052) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053)
FDI 0.297∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗
(0.076) (0.107)
Stock Traded 0.059∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014)
GDP Growth −0.267∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.070)
IR Spread −0.158 0.096
(0.260) (0.231)
RealIR 0.123∗ 0.092
(0.064) (0.068)
Inflation 0.206∗∗∗ 0.063
(0.064) (0.071)
Domestic Credit 0.017 −0.021
(0.011) (0.018)
Tobin’s q −0.007∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R&D 0.182 0.170 0.253 0.229 0.139 0.298 0.187 0.151
(0.645) (0.652) (0.650) (0.652) (0.651) (0.648) (0.643) (0.670)
Size 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA −0.113∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
PPE 0.110∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
NDTS 0.674∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.153) (0.156) (0.155) (0.153) (0.156) (0.153) (0.158)
Constant −0.173∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No No No No No No No
N 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 7,845 7,845
R2 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ∗ < .10, ∗∗<.05, ∗∗∗<.01.
M. Machokoto, et al. Journal of Business Research 109 (2020) 26–37
33
The results in Columns (3) and (4) also show a significant decrease
in corporate debt around the GFC, consistent with H3. This decrease,
which follows a substantial economic and liquidity shock, is in line with
the literature on the effects of the GFC on financing decisions in the
United States (Campello et al., 2011; Kahle and Stulz, 2013). Thus,
supply-side factors appear to play a significant role in explaining the
changes in corporate debt.
Finally, the results in Columns (5) and (6) indicate a significant
swing in the trend of corporate debt from negative to positive around
financial liberalization events. The significant and negative coefficient
on the time trend prior to financial liberalization reflects a substantial
decrease in debt usage during the apartheid era of sanctions and eco-
nomic isolation. The after-less-before difference in the trend coefficient
is statistically significant, which is a clear indication that the re-in-
troduction of SA to the global market post-apartheid explains why there
was a marked increase in corporate debt financing relative to the pre-
liberalization apartheid era. These results support H3 and, overall,
present strong evidence that supply-side factors play a significant role
in explaining the evolution of corporate debt in SA.
6. Robustness
We check the robustness of the results using two estimation tech-
niques (fixed effects and Tobit regressions) and alternative definitions
of corporate debt, as well as by dividing the overall sample into sub-
samples. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 present the results of the Tobit
regressions, where the dependent variable, corporate debt, is bounded
between zero and one. Columns (3) and (4), titled FE, present the re-
sults when using fixed effects across firms and industries. Columns (5)
and (6) present the results when using alternative definitions of cor-
porate debt. Finally, Columns (7)–(11) present the results of a sensi-
tivity analysis with subsampling and subperiod selections.
The results for the Tobit, fixed effects, and different definitions of
debt show significant coefficients on the time trend and on the period
dummies (Period2000 09 and Period2010 15), indicating that our results
hold for alternative estimation techniques and definitions of corporate
debt.
Several studies report marked changes in the composition of listed
firms, which may affect the observed evolution of dividends (Fama and
French, 2001), corporate investment (Brown and Petersen, 2009), and
capital structure (Custódio et al., 2013; Maes et al., 2019). In Columns
(7) and (8), we test whether our results are sensitive to the changing
composition of firms by focusing on balanced and unbalanced sub-
samples. The coefficient on the time trend for the balanced subsample is
higher than that for the unbalanced subsample. This implies that older
firms increased their levels of debt by more than younger firms did, and
that our findings are robust to this type of subsampling.
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in firm
characteristics by dividing the sample into three subperiods:
1990–1999 (the 1990s), 2000–2009 (the 2000s), and 2010–2015 (the
2010s). The results, presented in Columns (9)–(11), are, in general,
consistent in terms of the signs, magnitudes, and significance levels
presented in Table 5. The trend coefficient increases from 0.198 in the
1990s to 0.540 in the 2000s, and then to 0.852 in the 2010s. This
confirms the increasing level of corporate debt over time. The coeffi-
cients on all other traditional determinants of corporate debt maintain
the same signs. Furthermore, we find only minor changes in sig-
nificance across the three periods, supporting our finding that they
cannot fully explain the evolution of corporate debt.
Overall, the robustness tests suggest that, while changes in firm
characteristics do not explain the trend in corporate debt, supply-side
factors do play an important role in this regard.
7. Conclusion
This study analyses the determinants of the pervasive increase in
corporate debt in South Africa (SA) between 1990 and 2015. In addi-
tion to being an emerging economy, SA is unique in terms of its history,
financial and institutional structure, and development. The imposition
and subsequent lifting of apartheid sanctions had a substantial impact
on the development of corporate debt, the country’s stock markets, and
the patterns of debt finance employed by firms.
Our study complements the growing body of literature on rising
corporate debt and its determinants in emerging economies. However,
our results do not support those of prior studies, which tend to highlight
demand-side and macroeconomic factors as being more relevant than
supply-side factors. Furthermore, our results show that traditional de-
mand-side factors, though important, do not fully explain the increasing
Table 8
Supply-side factors.
Tech Bubble Global Financial Crisis Liberalisation
Pre-crisis Crisis Diff Pre-crisis Crisis Diff Before After Diff
Variables (1) (2) p-value (3) (4) p-value (5) (6) p-value
Trend×100 1.159∗∗∗ −0.015 0.004 0.988∗∗∗ −1.173∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.569∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.318) (0.227) (0.262) (0.252) (0.196) (0.053)
Tobin’s q −0.010 −0.016∗∗ 0.490 −0.010 −0.005 0.501 −0.007 −0.005 0.763
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
R&D −2.669∗∗∗ 2.572∗∗∗ 0.000 1.013 0.317 0.709 1.210∗ 0.081 0.292
(0.365) (0.913) (0.903) (1.851) (0.727) (0.645)
Size 0.010∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.215 0.007∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.416 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.108
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
ROA −0.352∗∗∗ −0.073 0.007 −0.119∗∗ −0.079∗∗ 0.493 −0.177∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ 0.265
(0.103) (0.047) (0.052) (0.035) (0.052) (0.029)
PPE 0.057 0.152∗∗∗ 0.032 0.100∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.028 0.148∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.040) (0.034) (0.033) (0.046) (0.021) (0.026)
NDTS 1.343∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.007 0.664∗∗∗ −0.278 0.003 2.625∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗ 0.000
(0.323) (0.228) (0.225) (0.328) (0.239) (0.159)
Constant −0.104 −0.182∗∗∗ 0.432 −0.190∗∗ 0.129 0.002 −0.176∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ 0.923
(0.109) (0.061) (0.075) (0.082) (0.071) (0.043)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No No No No No
Observations 1,046 1,345 1,542 1,588 1,035 7,008
R2 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.43 0.19
Crisis periods are four years around 2000 (Tech Bubble) and 2008 (GFC). ‘Before’ and ‘After’ 1995 - Liberalization year. Significance: ∗ < .10, ∗∗<.05, ∗∗∗<.01.
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levels of corporate debt. In particular, our findings show that most firm
characteristics have evolved in a direction contrary to the prediction of
an increase in debt financing. Macroeconomic conditions, especially
growth in capital markets, are partially relevant. However, supply-side
factors emerge as the most important determinants of the rising levels
of corporate debt in SA, because collateral-based lending (tangible as-
sets) has decreased.
7.1. Theoretical implications
The increasing level of debt, but decreasing level of tangibility, in-
dicates a shift away from traditional collateral-based lending. Decreases
in collateral reduce debt capacity, which may limit access to further
financing. This contradicts the finding of Maes et al. (2019) of a strong
link between pledgeable assets and access to short-term debt, especially
for firms exposed to the risk of serving distant export markets. This shift
away from collateral lending implies a marked increase in bankruptcy
costs, because several properties of intangible capital (e.g., irreversi-
bility, high asset substitution, high information asymmetry, low col-
lateral values, long investment horizons, and low chances of success
(risky)) pose unique challenges for lenders or creditors. This finding
corroborates those of earlier studies based on the United States that
document a marked transition of economies towards intangible capital
(Brown and Petersen, 2009; Manikas et al., 2019). Because bankruptcy
costs are markedly higher in developing economies (Menkhoff et al.,
2006; Ovtchinnikov, 2010), this increase in corporate debt and the shift
in corporate balance sheets exacerbate firms’ bankruptcy concerns. This
is because firms are becoming systematically overleveraged in a way
that increases vulnerability to financial shocks. This finding challenges
traditional collateral-based theories, because firms are increasingly
employing corporate debt, owing to the decreasing value and quality of
their collateral. In summary, our results lead us to question whether the
long-established debt–collateral nexus is changing, or whether a new
one is emerging. Thus, further research is required to establish new
corporate lending theories that emphasize the role played by supply-
side factors and intangible capital in accessing external financing.
7.2. Practical implications
Our findings also have several important practical implications.
First, the rise in corporate debt suggests at least a temporary boon for
corporate debt investors in developing countries, with likely changes in
approaches to corporate financing policies. Our findings complement a
discussion paper by the McKinsey Global Institute in June 2018 that
documents a 2.5-times increase in the global corporate bond market
over the past decade (Lund et al., 2018). This implies an increased
availability of nonequity external financing, which promotes economic
growth.
Second, the increasing level of debt and the shrinking collateral
accentuate the call for practitioners to implement robust and more
active strategies in managing financial risks, especially if they are ex-
porters (Maes et al., 2019). The deterioration of corporate quality,
coupled with the shift towards intangible capital, makes active man-
agement of a firm’s capital structure more pertinent.
Third, because most debt financing in developing countries is in the
form of short-term bank loans (Sorge et al., 2017), the attendant ma-
turity mismatches and refinancing risks require financial management
policies that are more active.
Fourth, the increase in corporate debt identified here indicates an
improvement in accessing external financing, some of which could be
channelled towards R&D. This could help narrow the technological gap
between African and developed countries noted by You et al. (2019).
However, the increase in intangible assets, coupled with the decrease in
R&D (from 2004 onwards) suggests that SA firms are increasingly
Table 9
Robustness tests.
Tobit FE OLS
Sub-samples
Alternative Definitions Balanced Unbalanced 1990s 2000s 2010s
TDA TDA TDA TDA LTDA STDA TDA TDA TDA TDA TDA
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Trend×100 0.312∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.198∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.067) (0.034) (0.021) (0.127) (0.045) (0.117) (0.106) (0.187)
Period2000 09 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006)
Period2010 15 0.044∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010)
Tobin’s q −0.007∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.000 0.017 −0.005∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.005 −0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
R&D 0.138 0.204 0.047 −0.076 −1.086∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗ −3.428 −0.357 −2.000∗∗∗ 1.656∗∗ −0.749
(0.364) (0.376) (0.279) (0.288) (0.349) (0.523) (2.641) (0.638) (0.507) (0.777) (2.022)
Size 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.020∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
ROA −0.163∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.252 −0.114∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.044
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.234) (0.026) (0.051) (0.034) (0.042)
PPE 0.105∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.000 0.154∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.010) (0.036) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.042)
NDTS 0.829∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ −0.754 0.631∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗∗ 0.278 0.213
(0.072) (0.072) (0.105) (0.107) (0.124) (0.062) (0.466) (0.149) (0.255) (0.188) (0.211)
Constant −0.202∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ −0.480∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ 0.034 −0.123 −0.102∗∗ −0.095 −0.171∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.079) (0.082) (0.028) (0.022) (0.178) (0.045) (0.074) (0.046) (0.074)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No No No No No No No No No No
N 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 8,043 1,144 6,899 2,318 3,680 2,045
R2 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.43 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.25
Pseudo R2 −0.27 −0.28
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importing innovation, rather than expending resources to generate new
technology or innovation themselves (the caveat here obviously de-
pends on whether resources channelled for innovation are expensed or
capitalized, whereas R&D in our data set is an expensed amount). This
finding is in line with that of You et al. (2019), who document a slow
rate, or even a reversal, of technological convergence in Africa. Simi-
larly, Seck (2015) argues that African countries will continue to lag
behind other developed countries until they start producing innovation,
rather than continuing to rely on procurement or transfers of tech-
nology. This is supported by George et al. (2016), who show that the
marginal benefits of R&D are much higher in developing countries than
they are in developed economies. This highlights the need to increase
the allocation of resources to R&D, especially in Africa, where it is
lower than elsewhere.
In general, our findings signal the need for managers to develop
robust active strategies to manage the increasing debt in environments
characterized by high or rising bankruptcy risk and costs. This would be
more pertinent during periods of heightened uncertainty about credit
risk, as in the run-up to the GFC.
7.3. Limitations and future research
Our study has certain caveats, which also suggest directions for
future research. First, although the results for a single country may not
be generalizable to other emerging markets, this study represents a call
to consider the often overlooked supply-side factors as determinants of
corporate debt in emerging and other economies, given the global shift
towards knowledge-based economies. In addition, we were unable to
control for bond characteristics, owing to the unavailability of firm-
level bond data. This ought to be considered in future studies on
emerging economies, when such data are available. Finally, we do not
examine the implications of rising debt on corporate policies. However,
our results suggest a call to investigate policies and practices such as
dividend pay-outs, the retention of earnings, risk management, and
corporate governance.
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